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DISCOUNTING BY PROBLEM AND NON-PROBLEM GAMBLERS 
WHEN THE HYPOTHETICAL CONTEXT IS MANIPULATED 
 
Jeffrey N. Weatherly 
University of North Dakota
 
The majority of the previous research on delay discounting in pathological gamblers has 
found that these individuals discount monetary consequences more steeply than do non-
gamblers.  The present study attempted to replicate this effect, as well as determine 
whether changes in the context in which the discounting decision was made would differ-
entially influence the discounting of non-gamblers and problem/pathological gamblers.  
Participants discounted $1,000 after being informed that their hypothetical annual salary 
was a certain amount.  Participants then completed the discounting task a second time af-
ter being informed that their hypothetical annual salary remained the same, had been 
halved, or had been doubled.  Manipulation of the participants’ hypothetical salaries did 
not alter rates of delay discounting, but the problem/pathological gamblers discounted the 
$1,000 significantly less than did the non-gamblers.  These results suggest that steeper 
rates of discounting will not always be observed in problem gamblers relative to non-
problem gamblers.  Potential reasons for the present results and their implications for un-
derstanding the relationship between discounting and pathological gambling are dis-
cussed. 
Keywords: delay discounting, problem/pathological gambling, university students 
____________________ 
 
   Over the past several years, there has been 
an increasing amount of research conducted 
on the process of delay discounting as it per-
tains to gambling, particularly as it pertains to 
pathological gamblers (e.g., Dixon, Jacobs, & 
Sanders, 2006; Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 
2003; Holt, Green, & Myerson, 2003; Petry & 
Madden, 2010; Weatherly & Derenne, 2010).  
Delay discounting is said to occur when the 
subjective value of a reinforcing outcome de-
creases because its delivery is delayed in time 
(see Madden & Bickel, 2010, for a recent re-
view).  Overall, research has indicated that, 
for pathological gamblers, the subjective val-
ue of outcomes  decrease  more  steeply as the  
__________ 
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outcomes  are delayed  than  they do  for non- 
pathological gamblers (e.g., Dixon et al., 
2003, 2006).   However,  such  an  outcome is 
not always reported (Holt et al., 2003).  Like-
wise, although some researchers have sug-
gested that there is an integral connection be-
tween the phenomenon of delay discounting 
and the disorder of pathological gambling 
(e.g., Petry & Madden, 2010; Weatherly & 
Dixon, 2007), others have questioned whether 
the relationship is as meaningful as some have 
supposed (Weatherly, 2010). 
   A recent report by Weatherly and Derenne 
(2010) both supported the general findings in 
the literature on the subject, as well as identi-
fying aspects of the relationship between dis-
counting and gambling that are not yet under-
stood.  In their study, university students 
completed the South Oaks Gambling Screen 
(SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 1987), which is the 
most widely used diagnostic screen for patho-
logical gambling.  Participants then complet-
ed a delay-discounting task that involved five 
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different outcomes.  The results demonstrated 
that SOGS scores were directly correlated 
with the rates of discounting of the monetary 
outcomes studied, but not the non-monetary 
outcomes.  Thus, consistent with the bulk of 
the previous literature, higher scores on a 
measure of gambling pathology were related 
with steeper rates of discounting.  However, 
this finding was limited to only monetary out-
comes.  Finding that the measure of gambling 
pathology was not related to rates of discount-
ing for non-monetary outcomes leaves open 
the possibility that differences in discounting 
in between pathological gamblers and non-
gamblers is not a general one.  Rather, the dif-
ference may be isolated to certain contexts. 
   Pursuing this latter possibility is potentially 
critical because determining how important 
understanding delay discounting will be for 
ultimately understanding pathological gam-
bling depends on the exact relationship be-
tween the two.  That is, if how steeply some-
one discounts delayed outcomes is a trait var-
iable as some have argued (Odum, 2011; and 
see Odum & Baumann, 2010, for a discus-
sion), then finding that rates of discounting 
are correlated with problem or pathological 
gambling suggests that problem or pathologi-
cal gambling are likely also trait variables.  
However, if changes in rates of discounting 
contribute to the appearance of pathological 
gambling as some researchers have suggested 
(e.g., Weatherly & Dixon, 2007), then deter-
mining what factors alter rates of discounting 
could help identify prevention or treatment 
techniques for problem or pathological gam-
bling.  On the other hand, if the appearance of 
pathological gambling leads to an alteration in 
how the individual discounts delayed out-
comes, then studying delay discounting is not 
going to be informative as how to prevent or 
treat the disorder.  In such a situation, the re-
verse would be true; understanding pathologi-
cal gambling would enhance our knowledge 
of the process of delay discounting. 
   One of the deficits of the current literature 
on delay discounting and prob-
lem/pathological gambling is that most of the 
studies to date have been correlational or 
pseudo experimental.  Weatherly and Derenne 
(2010), for instance, reported correlations be-
tween rates of discounting and participants’ 
score on the SOGS.  The Dixon et al. (2003) 
study, on the other hand, was pseudo experi-
mental in that participants’ group assignment 
was determined prior to the study.  That is, 
Dixon et al. (2003) compared rates of dis-
counting of pathological and non-pathological 
gamblers, but because these groups were pre-
existing, one cannot determine the direction 
of the relationship between discounting and 
pathological gambling prior to the disorder.  
The procedure employed by Dixon et al. 
(2006) did involve direct manipulation.  That 
study demonstrated that pathological gam-
blers tended to display steeper rates of dis-
counting when they completed the discount-
ing task in a gambling environment (e.g., a 
racetrack) than they did in a non-gambling 
environment.  Dixon et al. (2006), however, 
only studied gamblers.  Thus, it is not possi-
ble to determine whether or not similar 
changes in discounting rates would have been 
observed if non-gamblers were tested in the 
same environments. 
   In terms of delay discounting, research has 
demonstrated that rates of discounting can be 
altered by how the discounting task is framed.  
For instance, Weatherly, Derenne, and Terrell 
(2010) had two groups of university students 
complete a discounting task involving hypo-
thetical monetary outcomes.  One group was 
told that the outcomes were money they had 
won.  The second group was told that the out-
comes were money that they were owed.  Re-
sults showed that the participants who had 
supposedly won the money displayed steeper 
rates of delay discounting than did partici-
pants who were supposedly owed the money.  
Because rates of discounting vary inversely 
with the magnitude of the outcome being dis-
2
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counted, a finding called the magnitude effect 
(Chapman, 1996; Thaler, 1981), these results 
indicated that framing the money as  “owed” 
increased its subjective value relative to if it 
had been “won.”  Weatherly and Terrell 
(2011) subsequently replicated the same find-
ing, indicating that the effect of framing the 
discounting task reliably alters rates of dis-
counting.1 
   The present study was designed to deter-
mine if the previously reported differences in 
discounting would be observed between non-
gamblers and problem/pathological gamblers 
(as measured by the SOGS), whether altering 
how the discounting task was framed would 
alter the observed rates of discounting, and 
whether the effect of changing how the task 
was framed would differ for the non-gamblers 
relative to the problem/pathological gamblers. 
  University students were recruited to com-
plete a delay-discounting task and were ran-
domly assigned to one of four groups.  Partic-
ipants then completed the SOGS.  They then 
completed a discounting task that involved 
discounting the hypothetical monetary 
amount of $1,000 on two separate occasions.  
Prior to completing the task the first time, par-
ticipants were informed to complete the task 
under the assumption that they were earning a 
particular annual salary.  Prior to completing 
the task the second time, they were informed 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that Weatherly et al. (2010) and 
Weatherly and Terrell (2011) both employed the fill-in-
the-blank method of measuring delay discounting 
(Chapman, 1996), which was also used in the present 
study.  This method has shown to produce temporally 
reliable data (Weatherly, Derenne, & Terrell, 2011), 
although it has also been shown to potentially produce 
different rates of discounting relative to other methods 
of measuring delay discounting (e.g., see Smith & 
Hantula, 2008; Weatherly & Derenne, in press).  With 
that said, research has not determined whether the rates 
of discounting measured using this particular method 
are less, or more, accurate than other methods.  Varia-
bility across different methods of measuring delay dis-
counting is another potential reason to be cautious 
when interpreting the relationship between gambling 
and delay discounting. 
(depending on the group) that their hypothet-
ical salary was unchanged, had been halved, 
or had doubled. 
   Given the existing literature, the hypothesis 
was that participants who qualified as prob-
lem/pathological gamblers would display 
steeper rates of delay discounting than would 
non-gamblers.  The current literature, howev-
er, does not point to a specific hypothesis in 
terms of the other manipulations.  That is, one 
might predict that if one’s annual salary was 
decreased, then the relative value of money 
would increase, which would result in a de-
crease in how steeply one discounts a delayed 
monetary outcome.  Then again, if one was in 
greater need of money now than before, then 
one might behave more impulsively, which 
would result in an increase in how steeply one 
discounts a delayed monetary outcome.  The 
reverse arguments could potentially be made 
when one’s annual salary was increased.  
Lastly, if the difference in discounting rates 
between non-gamblers and prob-
lem/pathological gamblers is a trait variable, 
then one would predict a constant difference 
between these participants regardless of the 
context of one’s hypothetical annual salary.  
However, if state factors contribute to the dif-
ference in discounting between non-gamblers 
and problem/pathological gamblers, then one 
might predict to observe an interaction be-
tween group affiliation and the rates of dis-




   The original sample of participants consist-
ed of 279 undergraduate students enrolled at 
the University of North Dakota.  Participants 
were excluded from data analysis if they did 
not qualify as a non-gambler (operationally 
defined in the present study as scoring 0 on 
the SOGS) or a problem/pathological gambler 
(i.e., a SOGS score of > 3).  In other words, 
participants who scored one or two on the 
3
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SOGS completed the procedures, but were 
excluded from all analyses. 
   Thus, the final sample employed in the pre-
sent study consisted of 151 (109 females; 42 
males) undergraduate students.  The mean age 
of the participants was 20.7 years (SD = 4.8 
years) and the self-reported grade point aver-
age was 3.27 out of 4.00 (SD = 0.50).  The 
sample was racially homogenous, with 140 
(92.7%) self-reporting as Caucasian.  Ninety 
five participants scored 0 on the SOGS and 56 
scored 3 or higher (Mean SOGS = 3.93; SD = 
1.56; Range = 3 – 9).  Participants received 
(extra) course credit in their psychology class 
for their participation. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
   Participants completed the study using an 
online research administration program (SO-
NA Systems, Ltd; Version 2.72; Tallinn, Es-
tonia), which was accessible through their 
psychology class.  This system tracked partic-
ipation at the individual level.  That is, the 
system ensured that any individual could par-
ticipate in the study only one time even if s/he 
was enrolled in more than one psychology 
class.  Participants could access the system 
wherever they could access the Internet.  In 
other words, the researcher was not present 
when the participants completed the materi-
als. 
   Participants were randomly placed into one 
of four groups.  After the group assignment, 
the first item that was presented to each par-
ticipant was the informed consent form that 
outlined the study as approved by the Institu-
tional Review Board at the University of 
North Dakota.  Continuation beyond this item 
constituted the granting of informed consent.  
The next item was a demographic question-
naire, which asked the participant about 
his/her sex, age, grade point average, and eth-
nicity. 
   The next measure was the SOGS (Lesieur & 
Blume, 1987).  The SOGS is a 20-item ques-
tionnaire that asks about the respondent’s 
gambling history.  A SOGS score of 5 or 
more suggests the potential presence of patho-
logical gambling and scores of 3 or 4 suggest 
the potential of problem gambling.  The 
SOGS was employed because it is the most 
commonly used diagnostic screening measure 
for pathological gambling (Petry, 2005).  Re-
search suggests that the SOGS has good in-
ternal consistency and test-retest reliability 
(Lesieur & Blume, 1987; Stinchfield, 2002). 
   The final measure that was identical for all 
participants was the Gambling Functional As-
sessment (GFA; Dixon & Johnson, 2007).  
The GFA is a 20-item self-report question-
naire that was designed to identify the contin-
gencies that maintain the respondent’s gam-
bling behavior.  The four contingencies tested 
are tangible (i.e., money), sensory experience, 
social attention, and escape.  The GFA has 
been shown to have good internal consistency 
(Miller, Meier, & Weatherly, 2009) and ade-
quate temporal reliability (Miller et al., 2009), 
although its construct validity is marginal 
(Miller, Meier, Muehlenkamp, & Weatherly, 
2009). 
   The final task was a delay-discounting pro-
cedure that involved two phases.  Participants 
assigned to the 50-50 group were initially pre-
sented with the statement: “For the following 
questions, please assume that you have re-
cently signed a contract to start a new job that 
pays $50,000 per year2.”  They then complet-
ed the delay discounting task, which consisted 
of the following question: 
 
                                                 
2 The hypothetical salary amounts in the present study 
were chosen with three criteria in mind.  First, they 
needed to be realistic.  That is, although the present 
participants were university students and most, if not 
all, had an annual income below those tested in the 
present study, the goal was to use salaries the partici-
pants would recognize as being earned in the “real 
world.”  Second, it needed to be possible to parametri-
cally manipulate the salaries and still keep them realis-
tic.  Third, when they were manipulated, the goal was 
to maximize the manipulation (i.e., make the increase 
or decrease in salary “substantial”). 
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You have won a raffle in which the 
prize is $1,000 in cash.  However, it 
will be X time before you receive the 
prize.  What is the smallest amount 
of money you would accept today ra-
ther than having to wait X time for 
your prize? 
 
   This type of discounting task is called the 
fill-in-the-blank method (Chapman, 1996), 
with the participant supplying the indifference 
point at each delay.  This method is potential-
ly preferable to the typical binary-choice 
method because it greatly reduces the number 
of questions posed to, and answered by, the 
participant (see Smith & Hantula, 2008, for a 
discussion).  Participants were tested at five 
different delays, meaning they answered the 
above question five times.  The five delays 
that were used were 1 week, 1 month, 6 
months, 1 year, and 5 years.  The order of the 
five different delays varied randomly across 
participants. 
   After answering the initial five delay-
discounting questions, phase 2 began with the 
participants being presented with the state-
ment: “For the following questions, please 
assume that you are in the third year of that 
job and are still making $50,000 per year.”  
The participants then completed the identical 
delay-discounting task a second time. 
   Participants in the 100-50 group were pre-
sented with the statement: “For the following 
questions, please assume that you have re-
cently signed a contract to start a new job that 
pays $100,000 per year” at the beginning of 
phase 1 and the statement: “For the following 
questions, please assume that, after three 
years, you were laid off from your job that 
paid $100,000 per year and you have had to 
accept employment at a new job that pays on-
ly $50,000 per year” at the beginning of phase 
2.  Participants in the 200-200 group were 
presented with the statement: “For the follow-
ing questions, please assume that you have 
recently signed a contract to start a new job 
that pays $200,000 per year” at the beginning 
of phase 1 and the statement: “For the follow-
ing questions, please assume that you are in 
the third year of that job and are still making 
$200,000 per year” at the beginning of phase 
2.  Lastly, participants in the 100-200 group 
were presented with the statement: “For the 
following questions, please assume that you 
have recently signed a contract to start a new 
job that pays $100,000 per year” at the begin-
ning of phase 1 and the statement: “For the 
following questions, please assume that, after 
three years at your job, you have been pro-
moted to a position that pays $200,000 per 
year” at the beginning of phase 2. 
 
Data Analysis 
   Rates of discounting were determined by 
calculating the area under the discounting 
curve (AUC) as proposed by Myerson, Green, 
and Warusawitharana (2001): 
 
x2 – x1 [(y1 + y2)/2]  (Equation 1) 
 
AUC is calculated by summing the areas of 
the trapezoids formed by the indifference 
points (i.e., the participant’s responses) across 
the different delays.  AUC can vary between 0 
and 1, with the value varying inversely with 
the rate of discounting (i.e., high AUC values 
indicate little or no discounting and low AUC 
values indicate steep discounting). 
   Although there are other methods for meas-
uring rates of discounting (e.g., fitting the da-
ta to a hyperbolic equation; Mazur, 1987), 
Equation 1 was employed for several reasons.  
For one, it is does not presuppose the form 
discounting should take (i.e., a hyperbola).  
Secondly, AUC is a direct measure of the data 
rather than being estimated from the data.  
Thirdly, AUC values are typically parametric 
and therefore do not require data transfor-
mation prior to statistical analysis (see My-
erson et al., 2001, for a discussion). 
   Participants’ data were excluded from anal-
ysis if their SOGS score was either 1 or 2.  
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The remaining participants were divided into 
groups depending on their score on the 
SOGS.  Participants scoring 0 were placed 
into one group (non-gamblers; NG) and par-
ticipants scoring 3 or more were placed in the 
other group (problem/pathological gamblers; 
PG).  Thus, the final design consisted of eight 
groups 50-50NG (n = 29), 50-50PG (n = 16), 
100-50NG (n = 29), 100-50PG (n = 16), 200-
200NG (n = 18), 200-200PG (n = 13), 100-
200NG (n = 19), and 100-200PG (n = 11).  
The AUC values from each phase of the pro-
cedure were then analyzed by conducting a 
three-way (Group by Type of Gambler by 
Phase) mixed-model analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), with group and type of gambler 
serving as between-group measures and phase 
being a repeated measure.  Results were con-
sidered significant at p < .05 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
   Results of the ANOVA indicated that the 
main effect of group was not significant, F(3, 
143) = 0.54, p = .658, η2 = .011, indicating 
that discounting did not vary systematically as 
a function of the contexts presented to the dif-
ferent groups.  The main effect of type of 
gambler, however, was significant, F(3, 143) 
= 4.39, p = .038, η2 = .030.  Interestingly, par-
ticipants in the PG groups (Mean AUC = 
0.69; SD = 0.26) displayed significantly less 
discounting than did participants in the NG 
groups (Mean AUC = 0.60; SD = 0.26).  The 
main effect of phase was not significant, F(1, 
143) = 0.81, p = .370, η2 = .006, indicating 
that overall rates of discounting did not differ 
between phases 1 and 2.  The interaction be-
tween group and type of gambler, F(3, 143) = 
1.25, p = .295, η2 = .025, phase and group, 
F(3, 143) = 1.10, p = .351, η2 = .023, phase 
and type of gambler, F(1, 143) = 0.01, p = 
.919, η2 = .000, and all three factors, F(3, 
143) = 0.39, p = .760, η2 = .008, all failed to 
reach statistical significance. 
   Thus, the present results indicate that prob-
lem and pathological gamblers discounted the 
$1,000 prizes at a significantly different rate 
than the non-gamblers.  However, the differ-
ence was perhaps not in the expected direc-
tion.  Rather, the problem and pathological 
gamblers displayed significantly less dis-
counting than the non-gamblers, which is con-
trary to some past reports (e.g., Dixon et al., 
2003, 2006).  Thus, one could entertain the 
idea that the present participant sample and/or 
data set were suspect. 
   However, there are numerous reasons to 
believe otherwise.  For instance, although the 
differences across groups were not statistical-
ly significant, the rates of discounting in 
phase 1 of the discounting task were con-
sistent and interpretable.  That is, the mean 
AUC values of the participants hypothetically 
making $50,000, $100,000, or $200,000 per 
year were 0.606, 0.630, and 0.642, respective-
ly.  These results can be interpreted as, the 
lower the hypothetical annual income, the 
greater the tendency toward getting the prize 
money now rather than waiting.  Likewise, 
again although the results were not statistical-
ly significant, the change in rates of discount-
ing for the 100-50 and 100-200 groups be-
tween phases 1 to 2 were in the direction one 
might expect.  That is, the mean AUC values 
for the 100-50 groups went from 0.636 in 
phase 1 to 0.693 in phase 2, indicating that the 
hypothetical decrease in annual income tend-
ed to increase the subjective value of the 
$1,000 in prize money.  Likewise, the mean 
AUC values for the 100-200 groups went 
from 0.623 in phase 1 to 0.604 in phase 2, in-
dicating that the hypothetical increase in an-
nual income tended to decrease the subjective 
value of the $1,000 in prize money. 
   It is also the case that other aspects of the 
data were consistent with previous research.  
That is, participants’ GFA scores for gam-
bling for tangible outcomes (r = .557, p < 
.001), the sensory experience (r = .568, p < 
.001), social attention (r = .343, p < .001), and 
escape (r = .599, p < .001) all correlated sig-
nificantly with SOGS scores (Miller, Dixon, 
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Parker, Kulland, & Weatherly, 2010).  Fur-
thermore, escape scores correlated more 
strongly with SOGS scores than any of the 
other contingencies (Miller et al., 2010).  In 
fact, when only the data from the 56 partici-
pants who scored 3 or more on the SOGS 
were analyzed, escape was the only contin-
gency on the GFA that significantly correlat-
ed with SOGS scores (r = .358, p = .007)3.  It 
was also the case that SOGS scores were sig-
nificantly correlated with gender (r = .229, p 
= .005), with males tending to score higher on 
the SOGS than females.  That result is con-
sistent with the established idea that males are 
at higher risk for pathological gambling than 
females (see Petry, 2005). 
   Finally, not all previous research on dis-
counting has found that gamblers discount 
delayed rewards more steeply than non-
gamblers (see Holt et al., 2003).  In fact, it is 
possible that aspects of the present procedure 
contributed t to the finding of less discounting 
in the problem/pathological gamblers than in 
the non-gamblers.  Specifically, in the present 
procedure, the hypothetical outcome that was 
being discounted was a monetary sum that 
had been won through gambling.  In contrast, 
the participants in Dixon et al. (2003, 2006), 
for instance, were asked to make choices be-
tween two different hypothetical sums of 
money without mention as to why those sums 
were available.  By phrasing the outcome as 
money that had been won through gambling, 
the outcome may have held greater subjective 
value to the gamblers than to the non-
gamblers.  If that were the case, one would 
expect the gamblers to display less discount-
ing of that outcome than the non-gamblers 
(i.e., the magnitude effect; Chapman, 1996; 
Thaler, 1981).  Future research could poten-
                                                 
3 Scores on the GFA were not, however, significantly 
predictive of rates of discounting.  That is, when re-
gression analyses were conducted on discounting rates 
in phases 1 and 2 using the scores for the different con-
tingencies on the GFA as predictors, no significant 
effects were observed. 
tially test this possibility by manipulating how 
the monetary outcome was framed to see if 
rates of discounting displayed by prob-
lem/pathological gamblers vary as a function 
of whether the money has been won gambling 
or gained by some other means.  Future re-
search might also pursue whether the present 
results were influenced by the procedure used 
to collect the discounting data.  That is, the 
fill-in-the-blank method (Chapman, 1996) 
allows for the participant to generate the re-
sponse rather than choosing from a set of re-
searcher-determined responses.  Doing so 
may have maximized any potential differ-
ences in interpretation of the source of the 
$1,000 between the gamblers and non-
gamblers. 
   One goal of the present study was also to 
determine whether any differences in the rates 
of discounting between non-gamblers and 
problem/pathological gamblers would be dif-
ferentially affected by similar changes in the 
context in which the discounting occurred.  
As no significant interactions were observed, 
the present results do not provide evidence to 
indicate that the process of discounting for 
non-gamblers and problem gamblers is differ-
entially affected by such manipulations.  
Phrased differently, altering the participants’ 
hypothetical annual income did not produce 
statistically significant changes in the rates of 
discounting in the present study for either the 
non-gamblers or the problem/pathological 
gamblers.  Taken together with the finding 
that rates of discounting differed between the 
non-gamblers and the problem/pathological 
gamblers, these results suggest that difference 
between these populations in terms of dis-
counting is one of absolute rate, at least when 
it comes to monetary outcomes (Weatherly & 
Derenne, 2010), and not how the process is 
influenced by other contextual factors such as 
changes in one’s hypothetical salary.  Finding 
a difference in rates of discounting between 
non-gamblers and problem gamblers, but not 
how discounting is influenced by contextual 
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manipulations, could also be seen as support 
of delay discounting being a trait, rather than 
a state, variable (Odum, 2011).  However, the 
problem gamblers in the present study dis-
played less delay discounting than the non-
gamblers.  Thus, from a trait perspective, one 
would need to explain why in some situations 
gamblers discount more steeply than non-
gamblers (e.g., Dixon et al., 2003, 2006), in 
some instances similar to non-gamblers (e.g., 
Holt et al., 2003), and in some instances less 
steeply than non-gamblers (e.g., present 
study). 
   It should also be noted that the present re-
sults do not indicate that rates of discounting 
by problem or pathological gamblers could 
never be altered by contextual changes.  In 
fact, the idea that their rate of discounting 
might be influenced by whether or not the 
monetary sum being discounted had been won 
gambling is one potential example.  Although 
the present results did not produce a change in 
discounting with changes in contexts, the idea 
may be worth pursuing in future research.  
That is, inasmuch as the process of delay dis-
counting may contribute to the disorder of 
pathological gambling (e.g., see Petry & 
Madden, 2010), determining how to alter 
rates of discounting by pathological gamblers 
will be important in identifying successful 
treatment approaches for the disorder.  Per-
haps the most important contribution of the 
present data is the results indicate that rates of 
discounting by problem and/or pathological 
gamblers will not always be steeper than for 
non-problem gamblers. 
   In closing, aspects of the present procedure 
should be recognized as potentially limiting 
how broadly the results can be generalized.  
For one, the present participants were all uni-
versity students attending a Midwestern uni-
versity, they were relatively young, and the 
sample itself was racially homogenous.  Any 
of these factors could have influenced the re-
sults. Non-gamblers and problem/pathological 
gamblers in the present study were identified 
by the SOGS, which may be important be-
cause, although the SOGS is the most widely 
used diagnostic screen for pathological gam-
bling, it is not without its critics (e.g., see 
Gambino, 1997).  Lastly, had more partici-
pants been employed the results, and thus the 
interpretation of the results, might have been 
different.  Thus, as is the case with most re-
search reports, the present results require rep-
lication before the conclusions drawn from 
them are roundly accepted. 
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